RATS Conceptual Messages Wrapper (CMW)

Internet-Draft	RATS CMW	November 2024
Birkholz, et al.	Expires 20 May 2025	[Page]

Abstract

This document defines the RATS conceptual message wrapper (CMW) format, a type of encapsulation format that can be used for any RATS messages, such as Evidence, Attestation Results, Endorsements, and Reference Values. Additionally, the document describes a collection type that enables the aggregation of one or more CMWs into a single message.¶

This document also defines corresponding CBOR tag, JSON Web Tokens (JWT) and CBOR Web Tokens (CWT) claims, as well as an X.509 extension. These allow embedding the wrapped conceptual messages into CBOR-based protocols, web APIs, and PKIX protocols. In addition, a Media Type and a CoAP Content-Format are defined for transporting CMWs in HTTP, MIME, CoAP and other Internet protocols.¶

1. Introduction

The RATS architecture defines a handful of conceptual messages (see Section 8 of [RFC9334]), such as Evidence and Attestation Results. Each conceptual message can have multiple claims encoding and serialization formats (Section 9 of [RFC9334]). Throughout their lifetime, RATS conceptual messages are typically transported over different protocols. For example,¶

EAT [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] Evidence in a "background check" topological arrangement first flows from Attester to Relying Party, and then from Relying Party to Verifier, over separate protocol legs.¶
Attestation Results for Secure Interactions (AR4SI) [I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si] payloads in "passport" mode would be sent by the Verifier to the Attester and then, at a later point in time and over a different channel, from the Attester to the Relying Party.¶

It is desirable to reuse any typing information associated with the messages across such protocol boundaries to minimize the cost associated with type registrations and maximize interoperability. With the CMW format described in this document, protocol designers do not need to update protocol specifications to support different conceptual messages. This approach reduces the implementation effort for developers to support different attestation technologies. For example, an implementer of a Relying Party application does not need to parse attestation-related conceptual messages, such as different Evidence formats, but can instead utilize the CMW format to be agnostic to the attestation technology.¶

This document defines two encapsulation formats for RATS conceptual messages that aim to achieve the goals stated above.¶

These encapsulation formats have been specifically designed to possess the following characteristics:¶

They are self-describing, which means that they can convey precise typing information without relying on the framing provided by the embedding protocol or the storage system.¶
They are based on media types [RFC6838], which allows the cost of their registration to be spread across numerous usage scenarios.¶

A protocol designer could use these formats, for example, to convey Evidence, Endorsements and Reference Values in certificates and CRLs extensions ([DICE-arch]), to embed Attestation Results or Evidence as first-class authentication credentials in TLS handshake messages [I-D.fossati-tls-attestation], to transport attestation-related payloads in RESTful APIs, or for stable storage of Attestation Results in the form of file system objects.¶

3. Conceptual Message Wrappers

A RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) has a tree structure of leaves that contain payload messages associated with their content type. The two leaf node types are:¶

A CMW using a CBOR or JSON record (Section 3.1);¶
A CMW based on CBOR tags (Section 3.2).¶

Intermediate tree nodes are either:¶

A CMW "collection" type that holds together multiple CMW items (Section 3.3);¶
A CMW "tunnel" type that allows transporting CBOR CMWs in JSON collections and vice-versa (Section 3.3.2).¶

The following snippet outlines the productions associated with the top-level types.¶

start = cmw

cmw = json-cmw / cbor-cmw

json-cmw = json-record / json-collection
cbor-cmw = cbor-record / cbor-collection / $cbor-tag

The complete CDDL can be found in Section 7.¶

Section 4 and Section 5 describe the transport of CMWs using CBOR and JSON Web Tokens and PKIX messages, respectively.¶

This document only defines an encapsulation, not a security format. It is the responsibility of the Attester to ensure that the CMW contents have the necessary security protection. Security considerations are discussed in Section 9.¶

3.1. CMW Record

The format of the CMW record is shown in Figure 1. The JSON [STD90] and CBOR [STD94] representations are provided separately. Both the json-record and cbor-record have the same fields except for slight differences in the types discussed below.¶

json-record = [
  type: media-type
  value: base64url-string
  ? ind: uint .bits cm-type
]

cbor-record = [
  type: coap-content-format-type / media-type
  value: bytes
  ? ind: uint .bits cm-type
]

Figure 1: CDDL definition of the Record format

Each contains two or three members:¶

type:: Either a text string representing a Content-Type (e.g., an EAT media type [I-D.ietf-rats-eat-media-type]) or an unsigned integer corresponding to a CoAP Content-Format number (Section 12.3 of [RFC7252]). The latter MUST NOT be used in the JSON serialization.¶
value:: The RATS conceptual message serialized according to the value defined in the type member. When using JSON, the value field MUST be encoded as Base64 using the URL and filename safe alphabet (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) without padding. This always applies, even if the conceptual message format is already textual (e.g., a JWT EAT). When using CBOR, the value field MUST be encoded as a CBOR byte string.¶
ind:: An optional bitmap that indicates which conceptual message types are carried in the value field. Any combination (i.e., any value between 1 and 15, included) is allowed. This is useful only if the type is potentially ambiguous and there is no further context available to the CMW consumer to decide. For example, this might be the case if the base media type is not profiled (e.g., application/eat+cwt), if the value field contains multiple conceptual messages with different types (e.g., both Reference Values and Endorsements within the same application/signed-corim+cbor), or if the same profile identifier is shared by different conceptual messages. Future specifications may add new values to the ind field; see Section 10.4.¶

3.2. CMW CBOR Tags

CMW of type CBOR Tag derive their tag numbers from a corresponding CoAP Content-Format ID using the TN() transform defined in Appendix B of [RFC9277]. Such CBOR tag numbers are in range [1668546817, 1668612095].¶

The RATS conceptual message is first serialized according to the Content-Format ID and then encoded as a CBOR byte string, to which the TN-derived tag number is prepended.¶

The CMW CBOR Tag is defined in Figure 2 using two different macros. One for CBOR-encoded types, the other for all other types. Both macros take the CBOR tag number tn as a parameter. The cbor-tagged-cbor macro takes the CDDL definition of the associated conceptual message fmt as a second parameter.¶

cbor-tagged-cbor<tn, fmt> = #6.<tn>(bytes .cbor fmt)

cbor-tagged-data<tn> = #6.<tn>(bytes)

Figure 2: CDDL definition of the CBOR Tag format macros

To add a new CMW, the $cbor-tag type socket is extended with a new instance of the CMW CBOR Tag macro. For example, to associate conceptual messages of type my-evidence with CBOR Tag 1668576819, one would extend $cbor-tag as follows:¶

$cbor-tag /= cbor-tagged-cbor<1668576819, my-evidence>

my-evidence = {
  &(eat_nonce: 10) => bstr .size (8..64)
}

3.3. CMW Collections

Layered Attesters and composite devices (Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [RFC9334]) generate Evidence that consists of multiple parts. For example, in data center servers, it is not uncommon for separate attesting environments (AE) to serve a subsection of the entire machine. One AE might measure and attest to what was booted on the main CPU, while another AE might measure and attest to what was booted on a SmartNIC plugged into a PCIe slot, and a third AE might measure and attest to what was booted on the machine's GPU. To allow aggregation of multiple, potentially non-homogeneous evidence formats collected from different AEs, this document defines a CMW "collection" as a container that holds several CMW items, each with a label that is unique within the scope of the collection.¶

Although originally designed to support layered Attester and composite device use cases, the CMW collection can be adapted for other scenarios that require the aggregation of RATS conceptual messages. For instance, collections may be used to group Endorsements, Reference Values, Attestation Results, and more. A single CMW collection can contain a mix of different message types, and it can also be used to carry messages related to multiple devices simultaneously.¶

The CMW collection (Figure 3) is defined as a CBOR map or JSON object with CMW values, either native or "tunnelled" (Section 3.3.2). The position of a cmw entry in the cmw-collection is not significant. Labels can be strings (or integers in the CBOR serialization) that serve as a mnemonic for different conceptual messages in the collection.¶

The "__cmwc_t" key is reserved for associating an optional type to the overall collection and MUST NOT be used for a label. The collection type is either a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) or an object identifier (OID). The OID is always absolute and never relative.¶

Since the collection type is recursive, implementations may limit the allowed depth of nesting.¶

json-collection = {
  ? "__cmwc_t": ~uri / oid
  + &(label: text) => json-cmw / c2j-tunnel
}

cbor-collection = {
  ? "__cmwc_t": ~uri / oid
  + &(label: (int / text)) => cbor-cmw / j2c-tunnel
}

Figure 3: CDDL definition of the CMW collection format

CMW itself provides no facilities for authenticity, integrity protection, or confidentiality. It is the responsibility of the designer for each use case to determine the necessary security properties and implement them accordingly. A secure channel (e.g., via TLS) or object-level security (e.g., using JWT) may suffice in some scenarios, but not in all.¶

When a CMW is used to carry Evidence for composite or layered attestation of a single device, all components within the CMW must be cryptographically bound to prevent an attacker from replacing Evidence from a compromised device with Evidence from a non-compromised device. The protection of authenticity and integrity MUST be provided by the attestation technology. For additional security considerations related to collections, refer to Section 9.2.¶

3.3.1. CMW Collections' role in composite Attester topology

A CMW Collection's tree structure is not required to be a spanning tree of the system's composite Attester topology. If the labels carry semantic content for a Verifier (e.g. to improve Verifier performance or aid human comprehension), the collection SHOULD be integrity protected. For example, the collection can be integrity protected by including it in a signed token such as a CWT or JWT.¶

3.3.2. CMW Tunnel

The CMW tunnel type (Figure 4) allows for moving a CMW in one serialization format, either JSON or CBOR, into a collection that uses the opposite serialization format.¶

Both tunnel types are arrays with two elements. The first element, a fixed text string starting with a #, acts as a sentinel value. The #, which is not an acceptable start symbol for the Content-Type production (Section 7), makes it possible to disambiguate a CMW tunnel from a CMW record.¶

c2j-tunnel = [ "#cmw-c2j-tunnel", base64url-string ]
j2c-tunnel = [ "#cmw-j2c-tunnel", bytes ]

Figure 4: CDDL definition of the CMW tunnel format

The conversion algorithms are described in the following subsections.¶

3.3.2.1. CBOR-to-JSON

The CBOR byte string of the serialised CBOR CMW is encoded as Base64 using the URL and filename safe alphabet (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) without padding. The obtained string is added as the second element of the c2j-tunnel array. The c2j-tunnel array is serialized as JSON.¶

3.3.2.2. JSON-to-CBOR

The UTF-8 string of the serialized JSON CMW is encoded as a CBOR byte string (Major type 2). The byte string is added as the second element of the j2c-tunnel array. The j2c-tunnel array is serialized as CBOR.¶

3.4. Decapsulation Algorithm

Once any external framing is removed (for example, if the CMW is carried in a certificate extension), the CMW decoder performs a 1-byte lookahead to determine how to decode the remaining byte buffer. The following pseudo-code illustrates this process:¶

func CMWTypeDemux(b []byte) (CMW, error) {
  if len(b) == 0 {
    return Unknown
  }

  if b[0] == 0x82 || b[0] == 0x83 {
    return CBORRecord
  } else if b[0] >= 0xc0 && b[0] <= 0xdb {
    return CBORTag
  } else if b[0] == 0x5b {
    return JSONRecord
  } else if b[0] == 0x7b {
    return JSONCollection
  } else if (b[0] >= 0xa0 && b[0] <= 0xbb) || b[0] == 0xbf {
    return CBORCollection
  }

  return Unknown
}

5. Transporting CMW in X.509 Messages

CMW may need to be transported in PKIX messages, such as Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) or in X.509 Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).¶

The use of CMW in CSRs is documented in [I-D.ietf-lamps-csr-attestation], while its application in X.509 Certificates and CRLs is detailed in Section 6.1 of [DICE-arch].¶

This section outlines the CMW extension designed to carry CMW objects.¶

The CMW extension MAY be included in X.509 Certificates, CRLs [RFC5280], and CSRs.¶

The CMW extension MUST be identified by the following object identifier:¶

id-pe-cmw  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
          security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) TBD }

This extension SHOULD NOT be marked critical. It MAY be marked critical in cases where the attestation-related information is essential for granting resource access, and there is a risk that legacy relying parties would bypass such controls.¶

The CMW extension MUST have the following syntax:¶

CMW ::= CHOICE {
    json UTF8String,
    cbor OCTET STRING
}

The CMW MUST include the serialized CMW object in either JSON or CBOR format, utilizing the appropriate CHOICE entry.¶

The DER-encoded CMW is the value of the OCTET STRING for the extnValue field of the extension.¶

5.1. ASN.1 Module

This section provides an ASN.1 module [X.680] for the CMW extension, following the conventions established in [RFC5912] and [RFC6268].¶

CMWExtn
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-cmw-collection-extn(TBD) }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS
  EXTENSION
  FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009  -- RFC 5912
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
      security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } ;

-- CMW Extension

ext-CMW EXTENSION ::= {
  SYNTAX CMW
  IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-cmw }

-- CMW Extension OID

id-pe-cmw  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=
   { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
     security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) TBD }

-- CMW Extension Syntax

CMW ::= CHOICE {
    json UTF8String,
    cbor OCTET STRING
}

END

5.2. Compatibility with DICE `ConceptualMessageWrapper`

Section 6.1.8 of [DICE-arch] specifies the ConceptualMessageWrapper (CMW) format and its corresponding object identifier. The CMW format outlined in [DICE-arch] permits only a subset of the CMW grammar defined in this document. In particular, the tunnel and collection formats cannot be encoded using DICE CMWs.¶

6. Examples

The (equivalent) examples in Section 6.1, Section 6.2, and Section 6.3 assume that the Media-Type-Name application/vnd.example.rats-conceptual-msg has been registered alongside a corresponding CoAP Content-Format ID 30001. The CBOR tag 1668576935 is derived applying the TN() transform as described in Section 3.2.¶

All the examples focus on the wrapping aspects. The wrapped messages are not instances of real Conceptual Messages.¶

6.1. JSON Record

[
  "application/vnd.example.rats-conceptual-msg",
  "I0faVQ"
]

6.2. CBOR Record

[
  30001,
  h'2347da55'
]

with the following wire representation:¶

82             # array(2)
   19 7531     # unsigned(30001)
   44          # bytes(4)
      2347da55 # "#G\xDAU"

Note that a Media-Type-Name can also be used with the CBOR record form, for example if it is known that the receiver cannot handle CoAP Content-Formats, or (unlike the case in point) if a CoAP Content-Format number has not been registrered.¶

[
  "application/vnd.example.rats-conceptual-msg",
  h'2347da55'
]

6.3. CBOR Tag

1668576935(h'2347da55')

with the following wire representation:¶

da 637476a7    # tag(1668576935)
   44          # bytes(4)
      2347da55 # "#G\xDAU"

6.4. CBOR Record with explicit CM indicator

This is an example of a signed CoRIM (Concise Reference Integrity Manifest) [I-D.ietf-rats-corim] with an explicit ind value of 0b0000_0011 (3), indicating that the wrapped message contains both Reference Values and Endorsements.¶

[
  "application/signed-corim+cbor",
  h'd901f6d28440a044d901f5a040',
  3
]

with the following wire representation:¶

83                                      # array(3)
   78 1d                                # text(29)
      6170706c69636174696f6e2f7369676e65642d636f72696d2b63626f72 # "app
lication/signed-corim+cbor"
   4d                                   # bytes(13)
      d901f6d28440a044d901f5a040        # "\xD9\u0001\xF6҄@\xA0D\xD9\u00
01\xF5\xA0@"
   03                                   # unsigned(3)

6.5. CBOR Collection

The following example is a CBOR collection that assembles conceptual messages from three attesters: Evidence for attesters A and B and Attestation Results for attester C. Since attester C returns Attestation Results as CMW in JSON record format, the JSON record needs to be tunnelled. It is given an explicit collection type using the URI form.¶

{
  "__cmwc_t": "tag:example.com,2024:composite-attester",
  / attester A / 0: [
    30001,
    h'2347da55',
    4
  ],
  / attester B / 1: 1668576935(h'2347da55'),
  / attester C / 2: [
    "#cmw-j2c-tunnel",
    '[ "application/eat+jwt", "Li4u", 8 ]'
  ]
}

6.6. JSON Collection

The following example is a JSON collection that assembles Evidence from two attesters. Since attester B outputs Evidence as CMW in CMW record format, the CBOR record needs to be tunnelled.¶

{
  "__cmwc_t": "tag:example.com,2024:another-composite-attester",
  "attester A": [
    "application/eat-ucs+json",
    "e30K",
    4
  ],
  "attester B (tunnelled)": [
    "#cmw-c2j-tunnel",
    "g3gYYXBwbGljYXRpb24vZWF0LXVjcytjYm9yQaAE"
  ]
}

6.7. Use in JWT

The following example shows the use of the "cmw" JWT claim to transport a CMW collection in a JWT Claims Set [RFC7519]:¶

{
  "cmw": {
    "__cmwc_t": "tag:example.com,2024:another-composite-attester",
    "attester A": [
      "application/eat-ucs+json",
      "e30K",
      4
    ],
    "attester B (tunnelled)": [
      "#cmw-c2j-tunnel",
      "g3gYYXBwbGljYXRpb24vZWF0LXVjcytjYm9yQaAE"
    ]
  },
  "iss": "evidence collection daemon",
  "exp": 1300819380
}

10. IANA Considerations

RFC Editor: Please replace "RFCthis" with the RFC number assigned to this document.¶

RFC Editor: This document uses the CPA (code point allocation) convention described in [I-D.bormann-cbor-draft-numbers]. For each usage of the term "CPA", please remove the prefix "CPA" from the indicated value and replace the residue with the value assigned by IANA; perform an analogous substitution for all other occurrences of the prefix "CPA" in the document. Finally, please remove this note.¶

10.1. CWT `cmw` Claim Registration

IANA is requested to add a new cmw claim to the "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims" registry [IANA.cwt] as follows:¶

Claim Name: cmw¶
Claim Description: A RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper¶
JWT Claim Name: cmw¶
Claim Key: CPA299¶
Claim Value Type(s): CBOR Map, CBOR Array, or CBOR Tag¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): Section 3.1, Section 3.3 and Section 3.2 of RFCthis¶

10.2. JWT `cmw` Claim Registration

IANA is requested to add a new cmw claim to the "JSON Web Token Claims" sub-registry of the "JSON Web Token (JWT)" registry [IANA.jwt] as follows:¶

Claim Name: cmw¶
Claim Description: A RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper¶
Change Controller: IETF¶
Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 and Section 3.3 of RFCthis¶

10.3. CBOR Tag Registration

IANA is requested to add the following tag to the "CBOR Tags" [IANA.cbor-tags] registry.¶

Table 1
CBOR Tag	Data Item	Semantics	Reference
CPA765	CBOR map, CBOR array, CBOR tag	RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper	Section 3.1, Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 of RFCthis

10.4. RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) Indicators Registry

This specification defines a new "RATS Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) Indicators" registry, with the policy "Expert Review" (Section 4.5 of [BCP26]).¶

The objective is to have CMW Indicators values registered for all RATS Conceptual Messages (Section 8 of [RFC9334]).¶

This registry is to be added to the Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) registry group at [IANA.rats].¶

10.4.1. Instructions for the Designated Expert

The expert is instructed to add the values incrementally.¶

Acceptable values are those corresponding to RATS Conceptual Messages defined by the RATS architecture [RFC9334] and any of its updates.¶

10.4.2. Structure of Entries

Each entry in the registry must include:¶

Indicator value:: A number corresponding to the bit position in the ind bitmap (Section 3.1).¶
Conceptual Message name:: A text string describing the RATS conceptual message this indicator corresponds to.¶
Reference:: A reference to a document, if available, or the registrant.¶

The initial registrations for the registry are detailed in Table 2.¶

Table 2: CMW Indicators Registry Initial Contents
Indicator value	Conceptual Message name	Reference
0	Reference Values	RFCthis
1	Endorsements	RFCthis
2	Evidence	RFCthis
3	Attestation Results	RFCthis
4-31	Unassigned	RFCthis

10.4.3. Provisional Registration

Before the creation of the registry by IANA, new codepoints can be added to the provisional CMW Indicators registry by following the documented procedure.¶

Table 2 will be regularly updated to match the contents of the provisional registry.¶

The provisional registry will be discontinued once IANA establishes the permanent registry, which is expected to coincide with the publication of the current document.¶

10.5. Media Types

IANA is requested to add the following media types to the "Media Types" registry [IANA.media-types].¶

Table 3: CMW Media Types
Name	Template	Reference
`cmw+cbor`	`application/cmw+cbor`	Section 3.1, Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 of RFCthis
`cmw+json`	`application/cmw+json`	Section 3.1 and Section 3.3 of RFCthis

10.5.1. `application/cmw+cbor`

Type name:: application¶
Subtype name:: cmw+cbor¶
Required parameters:: n/a¶
Optional parameters:: cmwc_t (CMW collection type in string format. The parameter value is case-insensitive. It MUST NOT be used for CMW that are not collections.)¶
Encoding considerations:: binary (CBOR)¶
Security considerations:: Section 9 of RFCthis¶
Interoperability considerations:: n/a¶
Published specification:: RFCthis¶
Applications that use this media type:: Attesters, Verifiers, Endorsers and Reference-Value providers, Relying Parties that need to transfer CMW payloads over HTTP(S), CoAP(S), and other transports.¶
Fragment identifier considerations:: The syntax and semantics of fragment identifiers are as specified for "application/cbor". (No fragment identification syntax is currently defined for "application/cbor".)¶
Person & email address to contact for further information:: RATS WG mailing list ([email protected])¶
Intended usage:: COMMON¶
Restrictions on usage:: none¶
Author/Change controller:: IETF¶
Provisional registration:: no¶

10.5.2. `application/cmw+json`

Type name:: application¶
Subtype name:: cmw+json¶
Required parameters:: n/a¶
Optional parameters:: cmwc_t (CMW collection type in string format. The parameter value is case-insensitive. It MUST NOT be used for CMW that are not collections.)¶
Encoding considerations:: binary (JSON is UTF-8-encoded text)¶
Security considerations:: Section 9 of RFCthis¶
Interoperability considerations:: n/a¶
Published specification:: RFCthis¶
Applications that use this media type:: Attesters, Verifiers, Endorsers and Reference-Value providers, Relying Parties that need to transfer CMW payloads over HTTP(S), CoAP(S), and other transports.¶
Fragment identifier considerations:: The syntax and semantics of fragment identifiers are as specified for "application/json". (No fragment identification syntax is currently defined for "application/json".)¶
Person & email address to contact for further information:: RATS WG mailing list ([email protected])¶
Intended usage:: COMMON¶
Restrictions on usage:: none¶
Author/Change controller:: IETF¶
Provisional registration:: no¶

10.6. CoAP Content Formats

IANA is requested to register the following Content-Format numbers in the "CoAP Content-Formats" sub-registry, within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" Registry [IANA.core-parameters]:¶

Table 4: New CoAP Content Formats
Content-Type	Content Coding	ID	Reference
application/cmw+cbor	-	TBD1	Section 3.1, Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 of RFCthis
application/cmw+json	-	TBD2	Section 3.1 and Section 3.3 of RFCthis

If possible, TBD1 and TBD2 should be assigned in the 256..9999 range.¶

10.7. New SMI Numbers Registrations

IANA is requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the CMW extension defined in Section 5 in the "SMI Security for PKIX Certificate Extension" sub-registry of the "SMI Numbers" [IANA.smi-numbers] registry:¶

Table 5: New CMW Extension OID
Decimal	Description	References
TBD	id-pe-cmw	Section 5 of RFCthis

IANA is requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the ASN.1 Module defined in Section 5.1 in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" sub-registry of the "SMI Numbers" [IANA.smi-numbers] registry:¶

Table 6: New ASN.1 Module OID
Decimal	Description	References
TBD	id-mod-cmw-collection-extn	Section 5.1 of RFCthis

11. References

11.1. Normative References

[BCP26]: Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.
[IANA.cbor-tags]: IANA, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cbor-tags>.
[IANA.core-parameters]: IANA, "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters>.
[IANA.cwt]: IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.
[IANA.jwt]: IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
[IANA.media-types]: IANA, "Media Types", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[IANA.rats]: IANA, "Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS)", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/rats>.
[IANA.smi-numbers]: IANA, "Structure of Management Information (SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations)", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers>.
[RFC2119]: Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4648]: Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.
[RFC5280]: Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC6838]: Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.
[RFC7252]: Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7252>.
[RFC7519]: Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[RFC8174]: Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8610]: Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610, June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>.
[RFC9165]: Bormann, C., "Additional Control Operators for the Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL)", RFC 9165, DOI 10.17487/RFC9165, December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9165>.
[RFC9277]: Richardson, M. and C. Bormann, "On Stable Storage for Items in Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 9277, DOI 10.17487/RFC9277, August 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9277>.
[STD90]: Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.
[STD94]: Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8949>.
[X.680]: International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee, "Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of Basic Notation", CCITT Recommendation X.680, July 1994.

11.2. Informative References

[DICE-arch]: Trusted Computing Group, "DICE Attestation Architecture", January 2024, <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/DICE-Attestation-Architecture-Version-1.1-Revision-18_pub.pdf>.
[I-D.bormann-cbor-draft-numbers]: Bormann, C., "Managing CBOR codepoints in Internet-Drafts", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bormann-cbor-draft-numbers-04, 29 August 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bormann-cbor-draft-numbers-04>.
[I-D.fossati-tls-attestation]: Tschofenig, H., Sheffer, Y., Howard, P., Mihalcea, I., Deshpande, Y., Niemi, A., and T. Fossati, "Using Attestation in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-fossati-tls-attestation-08, 21 October 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-fossati-tls-attestation-08>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-csr-attestation]: Ounsworth, M., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., Wiseman, M., and N. Smith, "Use of Remote Attestation with Certification Signing Requests", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-csr-attestation-14, 21 October 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-csr-attestation-14>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si]: Voit, E., Birkholz, H., Hardjono, T., Fossati, T., and V. Scarlata, "Attestation Results for Secure Interactions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-07, 2 September 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-07>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-corim]: Birkholz, H., Fossati, T., Deshpande, Y., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Concise Reference Integrity Manifest", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-corim-06, 18 October 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-corim-06>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]: Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C. Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-31, 6 September 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-eat-31>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat-media-type]: Lundblade, L., Birkholz, H., and T. Fossati, "EAT Media Types", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-media-type-12, 3 November 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-eat-media-type-12>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-uccs]: Birkholz, H., O'Donoghue, J., Cam-Winget, N., and C. Bormann, "A CBOR Tag for Unprotected CWT Claims Sets", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-uccs-12, 3 November 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-uccs-12>.
[RFC5912]: Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5912>.
[RFC6268]: Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6268>.
[RFC7942]: Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.
[RFC9193]: Keränen, A. and C. Bormann, "Sensor Measurement Lists (SenML) Fields for Indicating Data Value Content-Format", RFC 9193, DOI 10.17487/RFC9193, June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9193>.
[RFC9334]: Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.
[STD96]: Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.